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1976

legitimate business purpose

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1984

private

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freeze-out

intrinsically fair

1984

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John Collyer

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1890

Partnership Act

1914

Uniform Partnership Act

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31 Simms *v.* Exeter Architectural Prod., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 677, 677–686 (1994).

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to be treated equally

to be treated fairly ³³

legitimate business purpose

less harmful alternative

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Application of Fiduciary Duty of the Controlling Shareholders of Limited Company

ZHENG Jianing WANG Lingjie

Due to the particularity of corporate governance, the interests of minority shareholders of limited company are facing direct threat from controlling shareholders. However, it is difficult to provide appropriate remedies to minority shareholders in China's existing corporate regulations. For similar problems, since the middle of the last century, the company law of the United States has developed a solution of imposing fiduciary duty on the controlling shareholder of closed corporations to other shareholders. The experience is worth profiting from. China could establish fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholder of limited company by legislation, or achieve the same effects by applying the analogy measure in judicial practice. To be specific, the main content of the fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholders of a limited company is to prohibit them from crowding out minority shareholders. Whether the controlling shareholder's behavior violates fiduciary duty should be judged by the standard of legitimate business purpose. If the same business purpose can be achieved through other way which does less harm to other shareholders, the behavior of the controlling shareholder will violate the fiduciary duty.

Controlling Shareholder; Fiduciary Duty; Squeeze-out; Legitimate Business Purpose; Analogy